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ABSTRACT
We consider a game played between a state sponsor of international terrorism, a terrorist orga-
nization and the victim of a terrorist attack. The state sponsor wishes to inflict as much damage
to the victim as possible without risking retaliation. The victim state wishes to end these attacks
as soon as possible, through non-retaliatory means if possible in order to avoid the penalty as-
sociated with retaliation. In this thesis we compare and contrast the victim strategies of buyout,
political attrition, and espionage tactics in an effort to maximize the profit of the victim and end
the game without retaliation.
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The majority of relevant terrorist organizations of the modern age have a state sponsor. The
benefits of these alliance are well understood and tend to be mutually beneficial. For the ter-
rorists, the alliance acts as a force multiplier, drastically increasing the effectiveness of their
operations. The state can have varying levels of support ranging from amnesty to providing
manpower, funding, and shelter. The state in turn gains a political tool that can act in their
interests while maintaining plausible deniablity. The alliances can be characterized as secret-
coalitions, where the nature, significance and sometimes even the existence of the relationship
is unknown to anyone except the sponsor state and the terrorist organization.
State-terrorist coalitions are present with the maritime domain as well. Smaller states can use
terrorism as a tool to control sea traffic or inflict economic harm on a target nation. According
to the International Maritime Organization, over 90 percent of the world’s trade is carried by
sea, because it is the most cost-effective and efficient means of mass transit [7]. Freight ships
can carry hundreds of 40-foot containers and tankers carry thousands of barrels of oil, gas or
chemicals. These deep draft ships travel along well known commercial sea lanes and traverse
several geographical choke points that are easily exploitable. Also, the Internet has made tar-
geting these ships even easier, because a terrorist can easily look up a ship’s route, nation of
origin, cargo, and dates of travel [1].
Another potential target is maritime infrastructure, such as, oil platforms, pipelines, communi-
cation cables, bridges, and underwater tunnels. These structures provide transit and communi-
cation services, but are also easy targets for a potential terrorist attack. Once again the Internet
can provide a swathe of information on potential targets including frequency of use and inspec-
tions, cost, and location. A perfect example of this is the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP).
LOOP is an offshore oil pipeline that stands in 110 feet of water designed so that deep draft
tankers can offload their cargo. LOOP has a throughput capacity of 1.7 million barrels of oil
per day, handles 13 percent of the U.S.’s crude oil and connects to several Midwest refiner-
ies [2] [10]. As is readily apparent, LOOP is an area of potential exploitation of a small nation
whose primary export is oil.
1
1.1 The Problem
Victims of a terrorist attack struggle to neutralize terrorist groups due to their size, informal
structure, and mobility. When involved in a state-terrorist coalition, these difficulties are com-
pounded by the sponsor’s ability to provide cover and protection within their borders. The coali-
tion makes the terrorist organizations exceptionally hard to find, track, and eliminate, and thusly,
hard to deter. International giants as a result are vulnerable to attacks from these covert groups
as they cannot bring their economic and militaristic strength to bear on their assailants [3]. The
overall advantage in these altercations is generally given to the terrorists. Though they lack
the ability to strike decisive blows, their maneuverability and covertness prevents significant
retaliatory blows.
Terrorism is an effective tool for weaker nations. The states that sponsor terrorism know that
they are no match for their targets, however, they often believe that they have no effective
alternative. Strong states such as the U.S., Israel, and India could easily topple Iran, Syria and
Pakistan, respectively, however, the strength of these nations fails to deliver a decisive blow to
the terrorism that afflicts them. Terrorism is "war by other means" and allows the sponsor to
operate in ways they previously could not. As a result, coercing a sponsor to abandon their
support is no simple task. Sponsors often go into the coalition understanding the risks that they
are taking, however, they also know that a coalition is difficult to spot and therefore difficult to
retaliate against. Also, their interests and ideologies often fall in line with that of the terrorists
making support even more appealing.
Should a victim believe that a coalition exists, the next challenge that the victim is presented
with is how to retaliate. As discussed it is difficult to track and eliminate a terrorist group, there-
fore direct retaliation is highly unlikely. The alternative is to retaliate indirectly by retaliating
against the sponsor physically or through sanctions. The challenge with this form of indirect
retaliation is the international repercussions that the victim has to face. Should the victim re-
taliate without sufficient evidence, the international community will punish it. As a result, the
victim is forced to endure several attacks, until it is readily apparent that the terrorists that are
responsible should be incapable of attacking to such a degree.
This thesis consists of five additional sections. In Chapter 2, we review the 2011 work by
Lindner et al. In Chapter 3, we will discuss a buyout strategy for the victim. In Chapter 4, we
will analyze the use of an economic exploit by victim against the state sponsor. In Chapter 5, we
will analyze a potential use of intelligence against the sponsor state. Finally, we will conclude
2
in Chapter 6 by summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of of the methods described in
Chapters 3,4, and 5.
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We will continue the game proposed by Lindner [6]. Consider a three-person game between a
sponsor/host state (H), the sponsored terrorist organization (T) and the victim of T’s attacks (V).
Assume V has been attacked by T, however, V is unable to directly retaliate against T. While
acting alone, T operates at a very low level and is only truly effective while supported by H.
As a result, V will retaliate indirectly against T by attacking or otherwise sanctioning H. The
level of support given by H is not readily apparent. Even if V is believes that H is supporting T,
there are often political restraints that prevent an attack on H without conclusive evidence. We
assume that external parties, such as, neutral countries or international coalitions, will sanction
V if V attacks H without sufficient evidence to demonstrate an alliance between H and T. In the
absence of physical evidence that definitively links H to T, mathematical analysis may infer a
connection. If the magnitude and frequency of T’s attacks against V suggest that T cannot be
operating by itself, and suggests that a relationship between H and T exists, then neutral parties
will accept the existence of a relationship.
In our model we will assume that T is receiving aid from H, but the alliance is unknown to V
until V is attacked. While acting alone, the strength of T’s attacks is q, where 0≤ q < 1. While
operating with H, this raises to p, where q≤ p≤ 1 and p = q means H does not support T. We
will assume that as long as T has support T will continue to attack with strength p. Since there
are no strategic considerations for T we will consider only the two person game between H and
V.
In addition to the strength of the attacks p, H must also decide at what time s > 0 to sever
relations with T. At some point in time the game ends because H is no longer allied with T or
V retaliates. We assume V does not retaliate until t ≥ 0. V only retaliates against H if H is still
allied with T, so t < s. However, if H has abandoned the coalition prior to V’s retaliation s≤ t.
Thus the game ends at τ = min{s, t}. Let the payoffs of V and H be denoted by ΠV (p,τ) and
ΠH(p,τ). The profits ΠV (p,τ) consists of the α-discounted cost of being attacked Fα(p,τ)
and the expected cost of retaliation c(p,τ). So





1 if t < s
0 otherwise.
(2.2)
H receives profits equal to the beta-discounted damage done to V, Fβ (p,τ), and three types of
cost:
• O1(p,τ): material cost of supporting T,
• O2(p,τ): accrued political costs created by being suspected of supporting T,
• O3(p,τ): the costs of retaliation by V.
Thus we have
ΠH(p,τ) = Fβ (p,τ)−O1(p,τ)−O2(p,τ)−δO3(p,τ) (2.3)
We will also assume that all the terms are differentiable with respect to p and τ and in partic-
ular ∂∂ pO
i(p,τ) > 0 and ∂∂τO
i(p,τ) > 0 for i = 1,2, and ∂∂τO
3(p,τ) > 0 by discounting future
payoffs. In conclusion, we have created a game with the following considerations
τ = min{s, t}
ΠV (p,τ) =−Fα(p,τ)−δc(p,τ)
ΠH(p,τ) = Fβ (p,τ)−O1(p,τ)−O2(p,τ)−δO3(p,τ).
(2.4)
2.1 The Victim’s Payoff
Here we will expand upon the payoff ΠV (p,τ) = −Fα(p,τ)− δc(p,τ) of the victim. We
assume a cost of Ap per time period, where A is the payoff obtained from a unit level attack of
strength p. However since T can execute a attack equal to Aq without support, the net cost from
the alliance with H is A(p− q) per time period. There is also a discount factor α . Payoff or
benefits of size z, obtained τ time periods in the future, in this case, have a discounted present






For V, there is a suspicion factor, µ , which corresponds to neutral observers confidence in the
evidence of a coalition between T and H. We assume that µµ+1 of the neutral parties will approve
of the attack while 1µ+1 disapprove. At the beginning of the game, µ has a relatively low value
µ(0) = c. As long as H is supporting T and T continues to attack at a higher level than q, µ
6
will increase at what will assume is an exponential rate, µ(τ) = ceλτ . Using Bayesian decision
making, we find that











(See [6] for justification), and thus equals zero when p = q.
We now consider the cost of retaliation, c(p,τ). We assume that if V is going to retaliate, then
V remains as an observer until time τ = t > s. At time τ = t + ε (where ε is infinitesimally
small) if evidence of the H-T coalition exists, then V retaliates. At this point the probability of
a positive benefit B is µ1+µ , and simultaneously the probability of a political cost K is
1
1+µ . The





V’s challenge is to determine if and when he should retaliate against H, which it decides by it
choice of t.
2.2 Victim’s Response
V’s maintains a more or less reactionary role within the game. As a rational player V’s objective
is to maximize his profit even in the worst case scenario. H intends to inflict the greatest possible
harm to V, and thus, H will act in a manner that gives V the lowest payoff at any given time.
V needs to maximize this lowest payoff in order to ensure consistently better payoffs, i.e. use
maximin strategies. It is useful to view ΠV graphically to understand its behaviors, see two
example cases in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. These figures demonstrate two key values for V,
namely t∗ time where maximum payoff with retaliation occurs and t¯ the value where the payoff
of retaliation exceeds that of no retaliation.
In [6], its is shown that t∗ is determined by the positive root of µ∗ in the quadratic equation that
results from differentiating ΠV (t)|δ=1 with respect to t. Namely,
−[A(p−q)+αB]µ2+[−2A(p−q)− (α−λ )B+(λ +α)K]µ+[αK−A(p−q)] = 0. (2.8)









Figure 2.1: In the figure above, the red line depicts V's payoff without retaliation and while the blue
is with retaliation. The doted vertical line t∗ is the maximum expected payoff if V decides to retaliate.
As τ approaches infinity, both payoff functions converge to ten, represented by the asymptote. Graph
was generated using the following values p = .5, q= .3, A = 5, λ = .08, c = .4, α = .1, K = 100, and
B = 50.
We will call this strategy the engage strategy.
t¯ is considered the break-even point and occurs when the suspicion factor has grown to a suffi-
cient level that V profits from retaliation as opposed to loosing. Thus,
K−µ(t¯)B
µ(t¯+1)






This break-even point exists in all applications of V’s payoff function and is unique. This we
will call the break-even strategy.
As can be seen in the figures, for low values of A, t∗ occurs to the right of t¯, Figure 2.1. In
this case it V will utilize the engage strategy, set t = t¯, and retaliate at t = t¯ + ε where ε is
infinitesimally small. The engage strategy ensures that V will at least ΠV (p, t¯) which is the
maximum value of lower of the curves.
8
Figure 2.2: In the figure above, the red line depicts V's payoff without retaliation and while the blue
is with retaliation. The doted vertical line t∗ is the maximum expected payoff if V decides to retaliate.
Graph was generated using the following values p = .5, q = .3, A = 20, λ = .08, c = .4, α = .1,
K = 100, and B = 50.
Alternatively, for large A, t¯ occurs to the right of t∗, Figure 2.2. Now V initiates the break-even
strategy, setting t = t∗+ε . In this scenario, V understands retaliation at this point will guarantee
a payoff equal to the maximum value possible with retaliation.
The only other strategy that V would employ is immediate retaliation, i.e. t = 0. This is an
unlikely situation, however it is possible if both t∗ and t¯ exist to the left of t = 0. In this case
both payoff curves would be monotonically decreasing for all positive t and the best result
would be to end the game immediately. Tabularly, the possible payoffs for V can be seen in
Table 2.1.
The latest that V will act in any situation is max{0, t¯}. It is possible for V to retaliate prior to
t¯, however, provided the negative repercussions of doing so are small compared to continual
attacks. This can occur if the values of B and K are sufficiently small when compared to con-
tinual attacks with strength A(p−q). In such a case, a preemptive strike would be favorable to
continuous harassment.
Also, for very large A(p− q), the first term in 2.8 will shift the positive root µ∗ toward zero.
9
Table 2.1: V's Maximin Strategies
Order V’s Maximum Strategy Payoff
0≤ t∗ ≤ t¯ t∗ −F(p, t∗)− c(p, t∗)
0≤ t¯ ≤ t∗ t¯ −F(p, t¯)
t¯ ≤ 0≤ t∗ 0 0
t∗ ≤ 0≤ t¯ 0 (cB−K)/(c+1)
t¯ ≤ t∗ ≤ 0 0 0
t∗ ≤ t¯ ≤ 0 0 0
Realistically, this means that the attacks by T are sufficiently strong that V will retaliate against
H earlier, regardless of the suspicion factor, in order to prevent future strong attacks.
2.3 The Sponsor State’s Payoff
Now we focus on the payoff of H,






indicates the accumulated costs of attacks to V with the discount factor β .
The first cost of H is the material cost associated with supporting T. This can be thought of as
a correction factor to the gross factor Fβ (p,τ). Since H has to payout a cost CT > 0 gener-
ated from a unit level attack. Thus, the material cost per time period is CT (p− q). The total





The political costs associated with supporting T are more complicated. As long as a suspicion
of coalition exists, H suffers a loss proportional to the suspicion factor µ(τ)µ(τ)+1 multiplied by
the cost incurred when the suspicion factor reaches its maximum of one. Let CP > 0 represent
the political costs associated with a unit level attack. Thus, the cost per time period when the
suspicion factor is one is CP(p− q). Since the political costs accrue over time, they must be
10








Similar to V, the retaliation costs of the H-T alliance with discounted future costs is
O3(τ) =CRe−βτ , (2.16)
with CR > 0 (Note O3 is not p dependent).
2.4 Sponsor State’s Behavior
Unlike V, H has the ability to influence the game in two ways, by the level of p and the length
of support, s. H can adjust these variables to change his desired payoff, ΠH , however H must
also consider when it no longer in his interest to support T. In order understand H’s behavior,





see Appendix A for derivation. Θ is vital in the selection of s and p by H. In [6] it was shown
that H’s optimal selection strategies are
s∗(t) =

t for Θ≥ 1,
min(s#, t) for cc+1 <Θ< 1
0 otherwise,
(2.18)
where s# is the solution to µ(s
#)
µ(s#)+1 = Θ. The interpretation of this is that for Θ > 1, the terror
profit A−CT outweighs the political costs CP of an attack. As long as this is the case, then H is
satisfied the alliance. Alternatively, if the political costs begin to exceed the terror profit, then
H uses a minimum threshold value of Θ as an indicator that it is time to withdrawal. Should the
minimum threshold fail to even be reached, H will not support T, because he cannot profit from
such an alliance.
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Also, Θ governs the selection of p, namely,
p∗(t) =
{
∈ (q,1) for Θ≥ cc+1 ,
q otherwise.
(2.19)
Once again the minimum threshold must be met for H to aid T. Because p is only regarded as the
assistance provided to T, as long as Θ remains above the initial suspicion values, T will provide
p. It must be noted though that λ and by association µ are functions of p. For p >> q, λ is
large and thus µ grows quickly and the game is expected to end sooner, however, during this
time T inflicts heavy damage to V per attack. Alternatively, for small p, attacks by T are fairly
weak, but the suspicion increases so slowly that T can inflict a lot of damage over along time
period. Thus, H must decide whether it prefers very few, strong attacks, or weak attacks over a
long interval. We will not discuss p in depth here, because we are focusing on alternatives for




In [6], it was suggested that perhaps V could encourage H to dissolve the secret coalition with T.
It was suggested that V could affect the effectiveness of a unit level attack by T (A(x)), material
costs (CT (y)), and political costs (CP(z)) with monetary investments x, y,and z. Through analysis
and logical assumptions, it was shown that z was the investment with the greatest return (See
Appendix B). In this section we will some implements potential investment methods and their
effects on the payoffs of H and V.
3.1 Buyout
Consider first that the victim decides that the best course of action is to attempt to buyout the
sponsor state (H). Essentially the victim has a suspicion that a coalition exists between H and
T, but does not have sufficient evidence to retaliate without reprisal. From core theory, we
understand that the coalition between H and T will remain in effect until such a time that the
payoff for H with T is less than that of H with V (we will refer to these as ΠH,T and ΠH,V
respectively).
3.1.1 Sponsor State’s Payoff
V in this scenario intends to payoff H with a single payment z(τ). We will assume that z(τ)
is a positive decreasing function for all τ , that diminishes after each successful attack. We
assume that it is decreasing, because as T’s attacks continue V’s cost of retaliation is discounted,
therefore rather than invest additional money, V will retaliate.
If H decides that he does not want to accept V’s offer the game remains the same. In this case,










where δ = 1 if V decides to retaliate and δ = 0, otherwise and µ = ceλτ . If V does decide to
retaliate, then the game is over, otherwise the game continues until H breaks relations with T.
13










where τ# is the time when the agreement is reached.
It can be shown that for any τ , ΠH,V (p,τ)>ΠH,T (p,τ) (See Appendix C), however, H knows
that he can achieve a payoff equal to max(ΠH,T (p,τ)) as long as H remains with T. This gives us
a lower bound for z(τ#), since ΠH,V (p,τ#)>ΠH,T (p,τ) for H to justify breaking his coalition














For ease of notation later we will call this bound BH(τ#), so z(τ#)> BH(τ#).
3.1.2 Victim’s Payoff
Now we consider the victim’s returns during this scenario. If H has decided to reject V’s offer
then V expects




where δ is the same as above. Should H accept the offer, V expects
ΠV,H(p,τ#) =−A(p−q)α (1− e
−ατ#)− z(τ#), (3.5)
where τ# is the time when the agreement is reached. Since V is assumed to be a logical player,
it follows that V will structure z(τ) in such a way that ΠV,H(p,τ#)> max(ΠV (p,τ)) (Note that
max(ΠV )< 0). To do otherwise would not benefit V. So we have that
z(τ#)<−max(ΠV )− A(p−q)α (1− e
−ατ#), (3.6)
which we will call BV (τ#). By combining 3.3 and 3.6 we find that
BV (τ#)> z(τ#)> BH(τ#)> 0. (3.7)
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These bounds do not hold for all τ , however. Figure 3.1 demonstrates a region where z(τ#)
meets the criteria we set forth in 3.7 and a region where the bounds do not hold. To the right
of the intersection of BV and BH , the payoff ΠH,V is no longer greater than ΠH,T and as such H
would remain with T.
The utility in this scenario comes from the lack of committed investment by V. Because, z is a
one time payoff that only occurs when H accepts the offer, the game returns to the basic model
described in Chapter 2 if the buyout is refused.
Figure 3.1: In the figure above, the red line depicts z(τ#) = BV , and the blue line depicts z(τ#) = BH .
The region between the two lines and left of the black point, is the region where BV > z(τ#) > BH .
Graph was generated using the following values p = .5, q = .3, CP = 15, CT = 5, A = 20, λ = .08,
c = .4, β = .1, α = .1, K = 100, and B = 50.
Since, V is trying to maximize his payoff, he is going to try to minimize z, but his offered payoff
to H must exceed H’s current payoff with T. Therefore, V will always pick z as close to the lower
bound as possible. Figure 3.2 demonstrates V’s payoff with z(τ#) = BH(τ#), and compares the
buyout strategy to the basic model’s options.
As can be seen in the Figure 3.2, there exists a time tsell at which point the buyout is no longer
15
Figure 3.2: ΠV where z = BH as compared to V's payoff's without z. The dashed black line is the
y=max(PiV (p,τ)|δ=1). This graph was generated using the following values p= .5, q= .3, CP = 15,
CT = 5, A = 20, λ = .08, c = .4, β = .1, α = .1, K = 100, and B = 50.
useful strategy. tsell is always less than the t∗ and t¯ strategies that we discussed in Chapter 2.
However, this is not an issue, because, by setting z(τ#) = BH + ε , where 1 >> ε > 0, V en-
courages a rational H to accept the buyout. By setting z this way, H is guaranteed to achieve
its maximum possible payoff, namely max(ΠH,T )+ ε, but it is to H’s advantage to wait until
tsell to accept, thereby giving V a payoff of max(ΠV ). It is trivial to show that provided that
tsell > 0, the buyout strategy is the optimal strategy for V, otherwise the game remains as it was
in Chapter 2.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of V’s choice of strategies.
3.1.3 Terrorist’s Response
It is discussed in [5] that should T become aware of H leaving the coalition, it is in T’s interest
to “double-cross” H. Such a double cross would involve a large scale highly visible attack.
Essentially T would perform a unit level attack with Ap so large that there would be no question
that H was supporting them. Such an attack essentially raise the suspicion factor mentioned
16
Table 3.1: V's Maximin Strategies with Buyout
Order V’s Maximin Strategy Payoff
0≤ tsell ≤ t∗ ≤ t¯ tsell max(ΠV (p,τ)|δ=1)
0≤ tsell ≤ t¯ ≤ t∗ tsell max(ΠV (p,τ)|δ=1)
tsell ≤ 0≤ t¯ ≤ t∗ t∗ −F(p, t∗)− c(p, t∗)
tsell ≤ 0≤ t∗ ≤ t¯ t¯ −F(p, t∗)
tsell ≤ t¯ ≤ 0≤ t∗ 0 0
tsell ≤ t∗ ≤ 0≤ t¯ 0 (cB−K)/(c+1)
tsell ≤ t¯ ≤ t∗ ≤ 0 0 0
tsell ≤ t∗ ≤ t¯ ≤ 0 0 0
in Section 2.3 to one, thereby greatly increasing political cost, O2(p,τ), of the now broken
alliance. Further research could explore how T "double-crossing" H with probability d, and
thereby increasing the political costs, effects the buyout price z(τ).
17




Assume once again that V can influence CP by investing z. This time however, V is beginning
a slander campaign against H. The longer that V campaigns, the more expensive H’s political
costs associated with supporting T become. Assume that CP is now a function of z(τ), namely
CP(z(τ)). Where z(τ) is on going investment strategy and CP(z(τ)) meets the criteria set forth
in [6] and shown in Appendix B, namely CP is increasing and concave down.
4.1 Victim’s Payoff
Unlike the previous scenario, we assume that V is continually investing z as opposed to a single
payoff. Therefore in order to measure V’s payoff we create an investment function I(τ) to
integrate over the interval, similar to the political costs accrued by H as seen in 3.1, therefore
z(τ) =
∫ τ
0 I(s)ds. V’s payoff becomes









We will also apply the following constraints to I(τ):
I(τ)≥ 0, ∀τ > 0, (4.3)
and
I′(τ)< 0 (4.4)
because, as in Chapter 3, we anticipate that as τ → ∞, V will invest less money as retaliation
becomes cheaper.
As is readily apparent in Figure 4.1, this method does not result in the highest payoff for V.
This is understandable though because V is not trying to maximize its payoffs, but instead
V is attempting to increase H’s political costs of being allied with T. V is gambling that the
increased political costs will force H to sever ties with T before V loses too much. As a result
this technique is only effective if V is powerful enough to pay the consequences.
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Figure 4.1: In the figure, the blue lines represent ΠV if V does not invest z. The red lines demonstrates
ΠV is V does invest, but H remains with T anyway. The black line denotes the time τ = τ˙ when
retaliation has a greater payoff than no retaliation. The values p= .5, q= .3, A= 20, λ = .08, c= .4,
α = .1, K = 100, B = 50, and I(τ) = e−.5τ were used in this graph.
Now we can assume that V anticipates acceptable losses while utilizing this method, however,









Therefore, V is willing to invest, if z is less than the political costs of retaliation. Taking the
derivative of 4.5, we find


















This should ideally occur before the payoff with investment becomes less than the payoff with
retaliation which occurs at τ˙ . It is important to note that as long as I(τ) > 0, the difference
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between ΠV |δ=0 and ΠV |δ=0 + z will continue to increase as τ → ∞. However, V can decide
to stop investing, set I = 0, at any time τstop. If V quits investing, V cannot regain what was
already invested and its payoff would be,









Thus, we have bounds for z and τ which we can utilize while exploring Θ.
4.2 Influence on Θ
As discussed in Section 2.4, the value of Θ greatly affects the behavior of H. By manipulating





We will not assuming any particular shape of CP(z), but we will assume that it is twice differ-
entiable and that,
CP(z)′ > 0 (4.11)
and
CP(z)′′ < 0. (4.12)
Also, we will assume that at t = 0, H has invested a certain political cost C¯P that V has no
control over, i.e. CP(z(0)) = C¯P. We make this assumption, because V is attacked at least once
before it has a chance to influence H in any way. C¯P is the political cost H anticipated prior to














Thus, we need to find the min z such that Θ(z)≤ cc+1 . By rearranging the equation we have
CP(z)≥ (c+1)(A−CT )c =Θbreak. (4.15)
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Thus, the minimum z required to force H to abandon its coalition with T is
z(τ) =C−1P (Θbreak). (4.16)
If V implemented 4.16 for the entire the resultant payoffs for H can be seen in Figure 4.2.
Realistically, this is not possible, since z(0) = 0, however it does demonstrate the increased
costs H has to endure when CP is increased. Also, the figure depicts the deadly effectiveness of
the attrition strategy on weak values of A, in particular A = 10 which fails to result in a positive
payoff for τ < 30.
Figure 4.2: This figure displays the expectant payoffs for H, if V is capable of achieving z=C−1P (Θbreak)
for the entire game. q = .3, p = .5, λ = .08, c = .4, β = .1, CT = 5, and CP = 15 (solid lines) were
used in this figure.
4.3 Application
Due to the lack of data to suggest any particular shape of the function CP, we can not solve
for z. However, we can apply criteria for z established in Section 4.3 and the minimum value
Θbreak where H will end the game to several examples to gain additional understanding of V’s
implementation of the strategy. Below we will implement examples keeping the following
22
values constant: CT = 5, p = .5, q = .3, λ = .08, c = .4, K = 100, B = 50, α = .1 and β = .1.
We will assume that CP is of the form
CP = C¯P+ z(τ), (4.17)
where C¯P is the political costs that H anticipates prior to the first attack, we will preset C¯P = 15.
By initiating the political costs to this value A> 9.286, so we will begin our examples at A= 10.





where R is the maximum single investment that V is willing to pay and γ is the decay rate.
The assumptions for z and CP(z) fall within our constraints and are therefore valid for exemplary
purposes.The tabulated vales below are the results of playing the game for various A. The bold
text is the best payoff for V and the strategy employed can be found in the far right column.
The payoff values ΠV − z, ΠH − z and ΠH are evaluated at the time tbreak. The "E[ΠV ]" payoff
value represents the payoff the V receives if it follows the strategies in Table 2.1 and "E[ΠH ]"
is H’s associated payoff. We will modify the values R and γ two times apiece in order to assess
the best way to approach the attrition strategy.
For our first example we will utilize z(τ) with R = 5 and γ = .1 as a base line for comparisons,
Table 4.1. Second, will modify increase our decay rate to γ = .2, which should increase the
τbreak thereby increasing the length of the integral, Table 4.2. In our third example, we will
reduce γ to −.05, Table 4.3. Doing so should reduce τbreak, and result in higher investments
being paid out for a longer time. For example four, we will examine the effects of decreasing
R to 2.5, Table 4.4. This will reduce the amount of money invested in any singular investment,
and as such, we should require additional investments in order to sum the appropriate z. Lastly,
we will observe the effects of increasing R= 15, Table 4.5. The high R value in this case should
result in higher singluar investments, and as such z should be reached in a more timely manner.
The examples show that the attrition strategy is a viable strategy for small A. As the results in
Tables 4.3 and 4.3 demonstrate, by decreasing γ and/or increasing R V can make the method
even more effective. Due to the decaying nature of the investments, the most effective strategies
involve larger payments in order to reach z = C−1P (Θbreak) as soon as possible. Also, V is
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Table 4.1: Table of Values for Example 1
A Θbreak t¯ t∗ τbreak ΠV − z ΠH− z E[ΠV ] E[ΠH ] Strategy
10 17.5 20.117 22.109 .510 -3.480 .0093 -17.325 4.393 Attrition
12.5 26.25 20.117 20.609 2.550 -16.881 .285 -21.656 8.724 Attrition
15 35.0 20.117 19.129 5.110 -32.008 1.258 -25.965 12.760 Engage
20 52.5 20.117 16.160 13.860 -67.493 7.625 -34.247 19.738 Engage
Table 4.2: Table of Values for Example 2
A Θbreak t¯ t∗ τbreak ΠV − z ΠH− z E[ΠV ] E[ΠH ] Strategy
10 17.5 20.117 22.109 .530 -3.547 .0093 -17.325 4.393 Attrition
12.5 26.25 20.117 20.609 2.990 -17.713 .379 -21.656 8.724 Attrition
15 35.0 20.117 19.129 8.050 -36.590 2.527 -25.965 12.760 Engage
20 52.5 20.117 16.160 189 -65.0 25.421 -34.247 19.738 Engage
Table 4.3: Table of Values for Example 3
A Θbreak t¯ t∗ τbreak ΠV − z ΠH− z E[ΠV ] E[ΠH ] Strategy
10 17.5 20.117 22.109 .510 -3.512 .0084 -17.325 4.393 Attrition
12.5 26.25 20.117 20.609 2.39 -16.578 .252 -21.656 8.724 Attrition
15 35.0 20.117 19.129 4.46 -30.784 1.009 -25.965 12.760 Engage
20 52.5 20.117 16.160 9.4 -61.875 4.707 -34.247 19.738 Engage
Table 4.4: Table of Values for Example 4
A Θbreak t¯ t∗ τbreak ΠV − z ΠH− z E[ΠV ] E[ΠH ] Strategy
10 17.5 20.117 22.109 1.05 -4.485 .0367 -17.325 4.393 Attrition
12.5 26.25 20.117 20.609 5.98 -22.504 1.213 -21.656 8.724 Break-Even
15 35.0 20.117 19.129 16.09 -43.995 5.964 -25.965 12.760 Engage
20 52.5 20.117 16.160 >250 -65.00 26.371 -34.247 19.738 Engage
experiencing continued attacks, so the more investments that V has to make, the more attacks V
must endure. In the absence of sufficient R and γ values, V’s best strategy is to avoid investing
all together. However, should V decide that it is to V’s advantage to accept the losses and reduce
H’s payoff, V should invest until t¯ is achieved, then immediately retaliate and end the game.
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Table 4.5: Table of Values for Example 5
A Θbreak t¯ t∗ τbreak ΠV − z ΠH− z E[ΠV ] E[ΠH ] Strategy
10 17.5 20.117 22.109 .170 -2.866 .0007 -17.325 4.393 Attrition
12.5 26.25 20.117 20.609 .78 -13.131 .0304 -21.656 8.724 Attrition
15 35.0 20.117 19.129 1.43 -23.984 .131 -25.965 12.760 Attrition
20 52.5 20.117 16.160 2.88 -47.545 .705 -34.247 19.738 Engage
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Through the use of espionage V can provide itself a several additional strategies. Intelligence
regarding the terrorist network can help V "harden" itself against T, thereby reducing the ef-
fectiveness of A, it can interrupt the network of materials that H is providing, or it can gather
evidence to increase the suspicion rate.
5.1 Using Espionage to Enhance the Suspicion Rate
Assume that V can invest into intelligence in an attempt to gain an advantage over H. With
this intelligence, V gains the additional evidence that increases the suspicion of a coalition.
The increased suspicion in turn will influence the break-even time for retaliation, t¯, and break-
alliance time for H, s#. In this version of the game, we assume V makes continual investments,
i, over the time interval to achieve a total investment, I, at time τ . At any given time, the
effectiveness of his espionage is modeled by f (I,τ), where f (I,τ) is a probability function that
modifies the suspicion rate λ .
Let i(τ) denote the investment V has allocated for intelligence at a given τ . As the game
continues, V will continue to invest i(τ) until the game is over in order to maintain its spy
network. Following the discount factor logic that we have assumed throughout this game, we













In [6] it was shown that λ was derived through the use of continuous Bayesian updating. It
was determined that ln(µ) was multiplied by ln(p/q) during a time period with an attack and
by ln [(1− p)/(1−q)] during a period of without an attack. For a T that is allied with H, the
attacks occur with a frequency p, in expectation ln(µ) increases at our rate λ , 2.6. Thus, the
larger the differential between q and p the greater the increase in our suspicions.
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Now, it is important to distinguish that V cannot find evidence if H is not supporting T. Recall
from 2.6, when T is alone p = q, which yields λ = 0 and the suspicion factor µ(τ) = c for all
τ . With investment, this should remain the case, i.e. continued investments when p = q yields
no return. Also, at time τ = 0, the initial suspicion factor is equal to c and
0∫
0
i(s)ds = 0, so
µ(0) = c. V expects that following an attack, his intelligence will be able to collect additional
evidence of collusion with probability f (I,τ), but will not recover any data when there is not
attack. Thus, λ becomes











Where f (i) has the constraints
f ′(i)> 0, (5.4)




f (I,τ)→ 1. (5.6)
Thus, we will assume f (I,τ) is of the form
R(1− e−ωI(τ)τ), (5.7)
where 0≤ R < 1 is the evidence collected and 0 <ω << 1 is a retarding constant. V’s resultant
payoff is as follows
ΠV (p,τ) =−A(p−q)α (1− e






ΠV (p,τ) =−(A+C)(p−q)α (1− e
−ατ)−δe−ατ (K− µ¯(τ, I)B)
1+ µ¯(τ, I)
, (5.9)










Now we will distinguish a time t˙ which represents the break-even point for retaliation during
the game with espionage. This break-even point, t˙, is found in a similar manner to t¯ and, since
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There is also a time tˆ that is determined by the positive root µ¯ of the quadratic equation that
results from differentiating 5.9 (δ = 1) with respect to τ . Namely,
0 =− [(A+C)(p−q)+αB]µ¯2+[−2(A+C)(p−q)− (α− λ˙ ′)B+
(λ˙ ′+α)K]µ¯+[αK− (A+C)(p−q)].
Algebraically this number is very difficult to find due to the time dependence of λ˙ , however,
through analysis of this quadratic we can gain an understanding of the where the payoff func-
tions maximums and minimums are located. The first term of the quadratic is negative and the
final term is usually positive. This implies that there is at least one positive solution µ¯ to the





if µ¯ ≥ c,
0 otherwise,
(5.12)
but as mentioned previously this is difficult to determine due to the changing nature of λ , how-
ever, because λ˙ > λ , it can be assumed that tˆ < t∗. This means that if intelligence is used the
maximum value of retaliation occurs earlier than without. Also, we should note that for K small
or A+C large the final term of the quadratic is negative. In this case, there is no positive root
and the maximizing value would be at tˆ = 0.
The intended outcome of investment in espionage is an improved suspicion factor. It is apparent
in Figure 5.1 and our understanding of tˆ and t¯ that this is the case. The increased suspicion rate
causes the break-even point and the maximum payoff to occur so early. It is possible to shift
these values farther to the left by adjusting C but as is apparent in Figure 5.2, the larger the C
value the smaller the maximum payoff. This is due to the increase in I, diminishing our returns
at higher values of C. Also, as discussed earlier, for excessively high C values the final term
of the quadratic can become negative causing our maximum payoff with retaliation to occur at
τ = 0.
The use of espionage does not change V’s strategies significantly in the game. V’s payoffs
change, however, the minimax strategies that he employs remain the same, see Table 5.1 below.
H’s strategies stay the same during this game. The greatest effect that espionage has on H is
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during the case when cc+1 < Θ < 1. In this scenarios it is to H’s interest to abandon T at s
#,
which will be pushed to the left just as tˆ and t˙ were pushed left.
Table 5.1: V's Maximin Strategies During Espionage
Order V’s Maximum Strategy Payoff
0≤ tˆ ≤ t˙ tˆ −F(p, tˆ)− c(p, tˆ)
0≤ t˙ ≤ tˆ t˙ −F(p, t¯)
t˙ ≤ 0≤ tˆ 0 0
tˆ ≤ 0≤ t˙ 0 (cB−K)/(c+1)
t˙ ≤ tˆ ≤ 0 0 0
tˆ ≤ t˙ ≤ 0 0 0
5.2 Future Works with Espionage Investments
Espionage could have a wide variety of impacts on this model. Linder proposed through in-
vestment V could cause increased prices in material costs, or diminish attack effectiveness by
discovering target locations, however, other options present themselves. An interesting future
problem might also involve the use of directed force in retaliation. Feasibly, V could accrue
intelligence with the purpose of using a directed attack against a terrorist stronghold within
H’s borders. This action would yield a greater positive benefit B for V, while simultaneously
reducing K should the stronghold meet the four requirements outlined in the law of war.
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Figure 5.1: This figure displays the expectant payoffs for V while using espionage versus without
espionage. In this picture V expects ΠV (p, t˙) which its the intersection of the two solid colored lines
near τ = 5. Without espionage (dashed lines) V expects much less and earns his payoff around τ = 18.
A = 20, q = .3, p = .5, λ = .08 (dashed lines), c = .4, α = .1, C = 4, B = 50,R = .4, and K = 100
were used in this figure.
Figure 5.2: This figure displays the expectant payoffs for V while using espionage and varying C. As
can be seen, the larger the C value the faster that V reaches his maximum payoff, however, V receives
a lower payoff by doing so.A = 20, R = .4, q = .3, p = .5, λ = .08 (dashed lines), c = .4, α = .1,
B = 50, and K = 100 were used in this figure.
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We did not alter the game’s three potential outcomes, but our efforts changed the payoffs sig-
nificantly. The game still ends when: 1) the state can continue sponsorship until the victim has
decided that sufficient evidence of coalition exists and retaliates against the sponsor, for exam-
ple retaliation at τ = 0, 2) in the case of an imminent retaliatory attack, the sponsor can decide
to break off sponsorship, ending the game before he can be retaliated against, s = t− ε , 3) the
state sponsor in the face of political costs that exceed the material benefits of sponsorship can
abandon the partnership even whether or not retaliation is a threat, Θ< cc+1 .
Our analysis shows that V can improve his payoffs within the game proposed by Lindner, by
appropriately investing in areas where H is weak, see Table 6.1 (Note that max(ΠV ) = ΠBuy).
By carefully considering his investments V can force H to end the game early or arrange the
game so that is less in H’s favor. Our exploration of the buyout, political attrition and espionage
strategies yielded some interesting results. Each method had its own strengths and weaknesses
that were caused by their method of exploitation.
By far the most stable of the methods was the buyout method. Assuming that the players were
both rational and that tsell > 0, it is to both of their benefits to accept the buyout strategy. By
the nature of the strategy, if H agrees to V’s offer both parties can exceed what they would have
achieved acting independently. H will receive more than the maximum achievable profit with
T, and V is guaranteed at least the maximum value achievable by retaliating. The added benefit
of the strategy lies in the single payout nature of the deal, thus if H refuses V is no worse off.
Political attrition was by far the most costly of the methods, however, this was assumed to be
the case from the beginning. The idea was built around the victim’s state willingness to "bleed"
H, therefore, it is only effective for strong victim states that were willing to accept a loss.
The strategy of political attrition relied on the vulnerability of the political cost that H needed
to endure while supporting T. By increasing the political cost associated with sponsorship, V
was able to reduce the acceptable profit ratio, Θ, until H could no longer support T. For small
A values this method was exceptionally effective because CP did not need to be significantly
elevated to diminish Θ, however, for large A, V assumed heavy loses in the effort to achieve his
goal. An added benefit of this method was that the H was unable to profit achieve high profit.
33
Table 6.1: Payoffs Associated with V's Alternate Strategies
A ΠBuy ΠAtt ΠSpy
10 -17.81 -2.866 -19.2638
15 -25.97 -23.984 -23.7144
20 -34.25 -47.545 -28.0764
50 -57.14 -237.5033 -52.3402
Overall, the method that performed the best was the espionage method. This strategy utilized
the ability to increase the suspicion factor, and thereby reduce the cost of retaliation to end the
game quickly. Not only did this method end the game quickly, it is able to elevate the expected
payoffs of V by a significant margin. The only thing discredit that can be brought to this method,
is that it requires retaliation. While the other two methods found ways for V to avoid retaliation
costs, this method has no means to force H to abandon T without the threat of retaliation when
Θ> 1.
The work in this paper is solely for exploratory use. The functional forms are by no means
grounded in empirical data and our parameter suggestions were merely hypothetical. We found
no reliable data to support any specific functional forms and thus have utilized simple functions
to analyze the data in qualitative term. The purpose of our work is merely to demonstrate new




Here we will briefly sketch the proof demonstrating H’s choice of withdrawal time s as created
by Linder [6].
A.1 Optimal s
Foremost, it is never to H’s interests to set s > t since retaliation can be avoided by setting s= t.
So, we will consider the case where δ = 0 and τ = s.























Is there an incentive to chose s < t? Consider the cost C(s) and the benefits B(s) H recieves











(1− e−β s). (A.5)





B′(s) = (A−CT )(p−q)(1− e−β s). (A.7)








which can be rewritten as s∗ = 1λ ln
Θ
c(1−Θ) .





which is always true since µ ′(s) > 0 for all s ≥ 0. Remember µ(s)µ(s)+1 is the strictly increasing
suspicion factor that bounded above by one and µ(0)µ(0)+1 =
c




When Θ ≥ 1, B′(s) > C′(s) for all s and H’s optimal strategy is to continue support until V is
about to retaliate, as such, H will set s∗(t) = t. When Θ< cc+1 , C
′ is greater for all s and H will




















Here we will briefly demonstrate that the marginal returns from investing in CP(z) surpass that
of A(x) and Ct(y) as shown in [6]. First assume that V can influence the values A, CT and CP by
investing x, y and z, respectively. As a result of these investments Θ(x,y,z) = A(x)−CT (y)CP . With-
out assuming any particular shape of these functions, assume that they are twice differentiable
and meet the following criteria:
A′(x)< 0 (B.1)




C′′T (y)< 0 (B.5)
C′′P(z)< 0. (B.6)
































Due to the lack of literature and data that would suggest any specific functional form for terms
of Θ we will offer a simple example for conceptual understanding.
The relationship between T and H is nearly invisible, which limits V’s opportunity to influence
this relationship directly. As a result, V’s will have more difficulty influencing CT (y) than A(x).
Hence A(x) will be more elastic with respect to investments that CT (y).∣∣∣∣ yCT (y)C′T (y)
∣∣∣∣< ∣∣∣∣ xA(x)A′(x)
∣∣∣∣ . (B.13)
Additionally, due to T’s ability to strike V in any number of locations, by several various meth-
ods, and at any time it desires, V’s efforts to reduce A must be done on a large scale across
several potential targets. This broad method will undoubtedly be expensive and require a sig-
nificant investment, x, in order to diminish the effectiveness of T’s efforts and H’s associated
payoff.
Conversely, any investments aimed at increasing the political costs, CP, that H must endure to
maintain its alliance with T, can be more precisely targeted by V. Under these considerations, it
is reasonable to assume that CP(z) is the most elastic of the three targeted areas.
For example from [6], let
A(x) = (x+a)−2/3
CT (y) = y1/2+ cT
CP(z) = z99/100+ cP
so that for increasing x, y, and z the elasticities approach -2/3, 1/2, and 99/100, respectively.
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The weak curvature of CP(z) implies that the marginal returns to investment decrease slower
than those of A(x) and CT (y). This is demonstrated by the high exponents in B.15 and B.16.
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Assuming that there has been no retaliation and that H is declining V’s offer, payoff that H can





























Holding all other variables constant we see that ∂ΠH,T∂τ (p,τ)→ 0 as τ → ∞.












However, we assumed that z(τ) was a positive decreasing function, thus z′(τ)< 0 and ∂ΠH,V∂τ <
∂ΠH,T
∂τ . From this we can see that ΠH,V reaches a maximum before ΠH,T . Also, z(τ) > 0, so
ΠH,V > ΠH,T , for all values of τ and p (See Figure C.1). As a result the maximum value of
ΠH,V is greater and occurs before ΠH,T .
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Figure C.1: H can expect greater payoffs from an alliance with V in all cases. The stars above denote
the maximum values of ΠH,V (red) and ΠH,T (blue). Graph was generated using the following values
p = .6, q = .3, CP = 15, CT = 5, A = 20, λ = .08, c = .4, β = .1, and z(τ) = e−.1τ .
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